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ABSTRACT  After distinguishing several ways in which the notion of the moral roots  
of citizenship and citizenship education can be understood, this paper focuses on the  
question ‘Is there some underlying attitude that citizens should have towards their  
fellow citizens?’.  It argues for respect, rather than love or care, as being the  
appropriate attitude, in part on the grounds that the emphasis on respect helps to  
make moral sense of the notion of global citizenship.
The rest of the paper argues that while understanding a person’s cultural background 
is necessary to respecting the person, there are two further connections between 
respect and culture.  First, respect itself is in part a cultural phenomenon.  Secondly,  
there is a case for saying that persons should respect, not only other persons, but  
cultures as such.  It is argued that this case is flawed in its presupposition that  
distinct cultures can be identified.  What is needed, rather, is respect for human 
cultural contexts in all their diversity.  
Introduction
The idea  of  the  moral  roots  of  citizenship  and citizenship  education  is  open to  a 
number of interpretations, as will be clear from the articles in this JME special issue. 
This  openness  to  interpretation  is  already  consistent  with  a  certain  kind  of  value 
pluralism, as is the very fact that it seems natural to speak of the moral roots, in the 
plural, of citizenship.  The kind of value pluralism in question is Isaiah Berlin’s, or 
something similar (Berlin 1990; 2002): its central claim is the denial that all values 
can be reduced to  one.   Such a  claim is  not  committed  to denying  objectivity  to 
values, or to asserting 
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relativism (though the  terms  ‘objectivity’  and ‘relativism’  both need more  careful 
attention than there is space for here).  Berlin, at any rate, thought it perfectly possible 
to hold that, for instance, liberty and justice are both, objectively, important values: 
the  point  is  that  they are  not  the same,  and are  not  necessarily  in  the  real  world 
consistent with each other.   This means that moral and political  agents sometimes 
have  to  decide  which  to  pursue  or  which  to  put  most  weight  on  in  particular  
circumstances.
If this kind of pluralism of values is recognised, then to any question of the 
form ‘what is the moral basis of citizenship?’ the right answer is likely to be that there 
is no single basis: a number of values, open moreover to a number of interpretations 
(as  Berlin  (2002)  famously  explored  different  interpretations  of  liberty)  will  be 
important in citizenship.  Any argument for putting special weight on one particular 
value,  or indeed on a particular interpretation of a particular value,  will not be an 
argument  that  this  is  the  only value that  matters.   It  will  be,  less ambitiously,  an 
argument for putting weight on a particular value in a particular context and with 
particular  purposes  in  mind.   It  is  in  this  spirit  that  I  shall  here  philosophically 
examine the notion of respect and argue for its special importance in citizenship and 
citizenship education.
We should remember – consistent with value pluralism - that the values we 
recognise come into play in different ways. Sometimes we appeal to a certain value as 
a standard when evaluating a state of affairs. Where the state of affairs is in some 
condition of a society - or indeed of the human world - then we may appeal,  for 
instance, to values of peace or justice as standards in criticising the  status quo and 
arguing  for  change.   Such  evaluations  are  of  obvious  relevance  in  contexts  of 
citizenship.  If such values are not all reducible to one - as utilitarians for instance, 
would  argue  they  are  -  then  there  is  room  for  argument  about  their  relative 
importance.  Is it better, for instance, that the human world should be one of peace 
even if some injustice has to be tolerated, or that it should be a world in which there is 
a  constant  striving  for  justice  even at  the  cost  of  peace?   Might  the search  for  a 
sustainable global environment mean that some injustice between different parts of 
the world has to be tolerated, and might some resulting conflict be an acceptable price 
to pay for the achievement of solutions to environmental crisis?
2
One important  question  for  citizenship  education  is  about  the  standards  of 
evaluation  that  we  should  encourage  and  enable  citizens  to  use.  Should  we,  to 
continue the same example, try to educate citizens so that they will think peace more 
important than justice, or justice more important than peace; or perhaps saving the 
environment more important than either?  That is to put the question very crudely, and 
no doubt any actual programme of citizenship education should be more sophisticated 
in its aims.  At the very least, we can try to educate citizens so that they are aware of 
the  plurality  of  values,  able  to  avoid  crude  dichotomies,  and  capable  of  making 
judgements that may have to be heavily contextualised.
It is not, however, only as standards for criticism and evaluation of states of 
affairs that values come into play.  We can recognise certain principles that we think 
people should try to follow in their actions, and we can identify personal qualities that 
we count as virtues.  It follows that when we raise questions about the values we 
should try to promote through education, different kinds of answer can be given: not 
only, for instance, that we should encourage citizens to use a standard of justice in 
reflecting  on  the  state  of  their  society  or  their  world,  but  also  that  they  should 
themselves try to act justly as a matter of principle, and, perhaps, that they should 
develop that deeper sense of justice that we might think of as an aspect of someone’s 
character (justice as a virtue).  The notion of ‘values’ is a very broad one, and justice - 
which is perhaps a paradigm case of a value if anything is - is not unique in being able 
to function in these different ways while still recognisably remaining one value.  As 
the relation between principles and character is addressed by David Carr in this JME 
special issue,s I shall say no more about it here as a general issue.  
Attitudes towards fellow citizens
My starting point for the rest of this paper is just one of the many kinds of questions 
that we may ask about the values that citizenship education should seek to develop: 
namely,  is there some underlying attitude which it is desirable that citizens should 
have towards their fellow citizens?  (I shall come later to the question: who is to count 
as a fellow citizen?) There are several attitudes that are often mentioned in such a 
connection, including tolerance, respect and (at least in some religious contexts), love. 
My argument will not be original in attributing a special importance to respect; but I 
want  to ask why respect  has  this  special  importance,  especially  in  a  multicultural 
context  in  which  there  is  a  need  for  a  discourse  of  global  as  well  as  national 
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citizenship.  I shall examine the claim that we should seek to educate students to have 
respect for other cultures as such. I shall argue that, while this claim is plausible, it is 
flawed in its presupposition that we can identify distinct cultures. What is needed is 
respect, not for distinct cultures, but for human cultural contexts in all their variety.
Something needs to be said first about what is involved in treating respect as 
one attitude, among others, that people may take towards their fellow citizens. Within 
moral  education  and  citizenship  education  we  may  sometimes  concentrate  on 
influencing how people behave towards each other. It is possible to treat respect itself 
as a matter of behaviour. Indeed Raz (2001) in a very subtle discussion of respect says 
at one point ‘respecting people is a way of treating them. It is neither a feeling, nor an 
emotion, nor a belief, though it may be based on a belief and be accompanied (at least  
occasionally)  by  certain  feelings.  It  is  a  way  of  conducting  oneself,  and  more 
indirectly, of being disposed to conduct oneself, towards the object of respect’ (Raz 
2001, p.138). On this understanding, if one role of citizenship education is to promote 
respect,  then the task could – in principle – be carried out by inculcating a moral 
principle that one should treat others with respect. If this were what promoting respect 
amounted to, it would be subject to the familiar difficulties that face any attempt to 
conceive of values education purely in terms of the teaching of principles.
As an alternative, one might attempt to give a virtue-ethical account of respect. 
As Carr’s paper in this JME special issue makes clear, this would not be incompatible 
with upholding a principle that one should treat people with respect, but it would add 
psychological richness to the way we understand respect. It would amount to trying to 
construe  the  disposition  to  respect  –  to  respect  the  appropriate  objects,  in  the 
appropriate  way,  and  so  on  –  as  a  quality  of  character.  In  advance  of  further 
exploration, it is not clear whether this can be done. On the face of it, while Raz is  
correct that respect may,  at least occasionally,  be accompanied by certain feelings, 
there is probably no specific kind of feeling, or specific kind of motivation, that has to 
be associated with respect, and for that reason respect may not be susceptible of a 
virtue-ethical account. At the same time, the point that respect may be based on a 
belief is important for education, since teachers have the general responsibility to see 
so far as they can that their students’ beliefs are well founded. Exploring beliefs about 
other persons and their cultural background may well be one way in which respect can 
be nurtured.
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If  respect  needs to be seen,  for educational  purposes,  as more than a pure 
behavioural disposition but less than a fully-fledged virtue, the category into which 
we can best place it – consistent with much philosophical discussion – is attitude. 
For the purposes of the present argument, no further analysis of the idea of an 
attitude need be attempted; ‘attitude’ can stand as a category within which we can 
compare  a  number  of  possible  orientations  that  persons can  have  towards  other 
persons (and possibly towards other kinds of objects besides persons).  Consistent 
with value pluralism, we should not expect an argument that there is just one correct 
attitude that citizenship education should seek to promote.   Nevertheless, we might 
argue  that  a  certain  attitude  should  be  promoted  as  fundamental  in  the  following 
sense: that people should hold that attitude in a way that will affect their orientation 
towards other values that come into play.  So, for instance, if love of their neighbours 
is a fundamental attitude for Christians, that will make a difference to the way they 
think about circumstances in which issues of justice or of war and peace come into 
play.  
Within the broad class of attitudes towards others, there are some attitudes that 
involve a negative evaluation of others: for example, hating others or despising others. 
Regrettably, there are historical examples in which the schools of a particular society 
have been used,  with more or less deliberate  intent,  to promote  negative attitudes 
towards certain groups of people1.  Putting such examples on one side, I shall assume 
that  any  ethically  justifiable  policy  for  citizenship  education  will  involve  the 
promotion of positive rather than negative attitudes.  That immediately raises an issue 
about tolerance (tolerance as a personal disposition, rather than toleration as a political 
and legal policy).  If we do not in some way dislike or disapprove of something, the 
question of tolerance towards it does not arise.  In practical contexts of citizenship, 
tolerance  is  often a matter  of putting up with something which one does not  like 
simply because it is different from what one is used to. While certainly better, in that 
context, than intolerance, it is doubtful whether it should in itself be called a positive 
attitude.
Within the class of attitudes that are more certainly positive, there is still  a 
question to be asked about which attitudes it is most important to promote.  In asking 
this  question,  I  shall  assume  that  the  answer  will  have  to  apply  to  citizenship 
education  that  can  be  undertaken  within  schools  that  are  themselves  open  to  the 
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children of all  citizens within liberal  societies.   I  shall  leave aside the question of 
whether  schools  that  are  committed  to  a  particular  religious  perspective  might 
promote  as fundamental  to  citizenship  some different  attitude  to  that  promoted in 
secular schools. Here I shall make the presumption, admittedly one that needs further 
defence, that to look for one attitude as being fundamental for citizenship is to look 
for an attitude that all citizens could in principle take towards each other.  In this light 
it  is  doubtful  whether  love can be the right  answer,  since (even putting aside the 
question whether love falls  into the category of attitude)  there are many issues of 
interpretation that would need to be faced if love is to be extended from the sphere of 
interpersonal relationships to that of relationships between citizens.   If a particular 
framework,  which might  be Christian or might  be that  of some other religious  or 
spiritual perspective, is assumed, then there may be at least some basis for interpreting 
what  love would mean in a  context  of citizenship.   If  no such framework can be 
assumed, the idea of love of each human being for their fellow human beings will 
probably seem both too ambitious and too tenuous as a basis for citizenship.  There is 
also a more specific danger in emphasising love.  Psychologically, it does not seem 
easy to extend love for what is perceived as close and similar towards love for what is  
more distant and different.  Love for fellow-citizens can easily be interpreted as love 
for those with whom one shares citizenship within a nation-state.  In other words, love 
for fellow citizens may be uncomfortably close to love of one’s country, and while 
that notion is open to a benign interpretation, its dangers hardly need to be spelled out.
Another candidate might be an attitude of care towards others, but this faces 
somewhat similar difficulties.  As interpreted by Noddings (1984; Noddings and Slote 
2003), caring is, at bottom, not an attitude of one person but a relationship that has to 
be completed by the involvement of the person cared for.  Though Noddings has tried 
to  extend  her  basic  notion  of  caring  to  other  contexts  beyond  the  directly 
interpersonal,  the idea of the caring relationship will  inevitably seem attenuated if 
seen as the fundamental relationship between citizens.  Besides, when it is detached 
from the contexts of direct interpersonal relationships, the idea of the citizen having a 
caring attitude towards others can easily slip into the sort of benevolence that can be 
patronising, in which the one caring operates with their own idea of what is good for 
the other.  That rather detached kind of caring can, in turn, lend itself to a weighing up 
of  consequences  that  is  little  different  from  utilitarian  calculation,  in  which  the 
importance of each individual can be downgraded.
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There is no doubt more that could be said about love or care or perhaps other 
candidates, but my purpose here is to make a case for respect as fundamental.  I shall 
make that case largely by unpacking what is involved in respect and showing that 
treating  respect  as  fundamental  can  make  sense  in  contexts  not  only  of  national 
citizenship  but  also  of  global  citizenship.  Importantly,  it  can  make  sense  across 
cultural differences.  Exploring that point will lead to an argument that citizenship 
education should promote not only respect for persons - fellow human beings - but 
also respect for cultural difference.   
National and global citizenship
The notion of global citizenship is a popular one among many educators2.  There is, 
however, by no means universal agreement that the notion of global citizenship even 
makes  sense,  let  alone  being  something  that  we can  sensibly  educate  people  for. 
Sceptics such as David Miller (2000, Ch. 5) have argued that the status, the rights and 
the responsibilities of citizenship have no reality outside the existence of shared bonds 
with  fellow citizens  and the  existence  of  institutions  through  which  the  rights  of 
citizens can be secured and their responsibilities carried out.  For historical reasons 
the  relevant  institutions  operate  mainly  at  the  level  of  nation  states,  and 
psychologically  the  idea  of  nationhood  seems  able  to  function  as  a  focus  for 
identification with others.  On such an argument the idea of global citizenship is at 
best metaphorical, even if it is an expression of an admirable aspiration.
I have already suggested, referring to love, that the bonds that create a shared 
sense of  belonging across citizens  of  one country may be difficult  to extend to  a 
global context.  If we are to make sense of global citizenship nevertheless, we need to 
be able to see it as supported by attitudes that are possible across a global context, yet 
that do not make global citizenship collapse into morality as such.  
The problem here is that some accounts of global citizenship in effect do no 
more  than  emphasize  the  consequences  of  taking our  moral  agency seriously.  As 
moral agents we should be benevolent; we should recognise our responsibility for the 
consequences  of  our  actions;  we should have respect  for  persons  (these ideas  are 
commonplace in widespread conceptions of morality, even if theoretically they may 
sometimes  be  pulled  apart  in  consequentialist  and  Kantian  directions).  There  is 
nothing in these ideas to imply that their scope should be limited by national or any 
other boundaries; implicitly, they already have global scope. Sometimes talk of global 
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citizenship seems to be a roundabout way of making that point.   But if that is all it is,  
then the notion of citizenship seems unnecessary to making the point.  If the central 
educational concern lying behind the idea of global citizenship is essentially the idea 
of moral education as such, then we do not have to emphasize the idea of citizenship. 
We could instead play down the idea of citizenship and simply emphasize that all 
human beings are of equal moral standing and that the responsibilities of moral agents 
are not subject to any arbitrary limits.   
If respect for persons is in itself a root moral notion, and inherently universal 
in  the  scope of  its  application,  why do we need to  investigate  respect  as  a  basis 
specifically for citizenship?  Here it is important that we can have respect for a person 
under some description.  I can, for instance, respect certain people as colleagues.  This 
is entirely compatible with respecting them as persons, but it is also more specific.  I 
am conscious of sharing with my colleagues in some joint enterprise, I give weight to 
the contribution they seek to make to that enterprise, I am inclined to trust that they 
wish the enterprise to succeed, and so on.  In a similar way, to respect certain people 
as fellow citizens, while compatible with respecting them as persons, adds something 
more to that notion.  Let us look at this first at the level of citizenship with which we 
are most familiar - within the nation state.  Here it is important that relationships with 
fellow citizens can be seen as relationships within a shared enterprise within which 
there is influence to be wielded and decisions to be made; in short these relationships 
are political: some have power over others and all potentially have the possibility of 
exercising some power.  We can see the society that we share with fellow citizens as 
having  at  least  the  potential  to  be,  in  Rawls’  term,  a  fair  system  of  cooperation 
(Rawls, 2001). Then too, with fellow citizens we can see ourselves as sharing a fate,  
in Melissa Williams’ term, and thus having some motivation to ameliorate that fate 
(Williams, 2003).  This is enough to give some purchase to the idea of having respect 
for  one’s  fellow citizens,  as  a  notion  that  is  not  simply  equivalent  to  respect  for 
persons.  
Perhaps for much of human history these notions of sharing a fate with others, 
of potentially being members of a fair system of cooperation, of having the potential 
with others to exercise some influence over the shared fate - to exercise some power 
over others, or voluntarily to refrain from doing so - could never be extended to a 
global scope.  Now, however, it is not only possible for people to see themselves both 
as sharing a fate with the rest of the world’s population and as having some possibility 
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of exercising or refraining from exercising influence over that fate, but arguably it is 
necessary in terms of justice, peace and even long-term expediency that people do see 
themselves in this way.  People can see themselves as global citizens (though whether 
they  will  do  so  is  heavily  dependent  on  the  kind  of  education  they  receive)  and 
thereby can also see others as global citizens, who as citizens of the same world have 
an equal standing.  People can, therefore, have respect for others as citizens of the 
same world, and this does add something to simply having respect for persons. 
Respect as the root notion here assumes that all people share in one world and 
are all caught up in the structures of power and politics in that world.  But it does not 
assume that all are the same in more substantial ways: it does not assume that all have 
the same beliefs or the same priorities in their lives. There is an element of distance - 
of the recognition of the other as other - inherent in respect that does not seem to be 
similarly  inherent  in  love  or  in  caring,  interpreted  in  Noddings’  way.  We  can 
comprehend this  in relation  to the Kantian roots of much of the understanding of 
respect in modern ethics.  One does not have to accept all of Kant’s ethical theory to 
accept that to respect persons is to recognise that other persons are ends in themselves 
and to treat them accordingly: that is, never to treat them purely as means to one’s 
own ends, and, we can add, never to assume that one can understand them or judge 
them purely from one’s own perspective without taking any account of their values or 
their perspective.  To accept this does not mean that criticism is ruled out, but it does 
mean that it is possible to distinguish more and less respectful ways of approaching 
and of expressing evaluative judgments that are made about others.  It hardly needs to 
be spelled out that respect in this sense is important in citizenship, and not least when 
ideas of citizenship are extended beyond national boundaries.
Respect and culture
From what has just been said it follows that respect for persons has to take a person’s 
cultural context into account.  Respect has to be expressed or shown in some way 
(where sometimes the way of showing respect may be to refrain from some action or 
speech).   Exactly what  is  counted as respectful  behaviour  -  and therefore what  is 
perceived  as  an  expression  of  respect  -  can  vary  culturally.   Therefore  to  know 
whether someone else is being respectful we need to have, if not certain knowledge of 
their cultural positioning, then at least some basis for a provisional presumption about 
‘where they are coming from’.   Similarly, to show respect to another we need to have 
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at least a basis for a provisional presumption about how our speech or action towards 
them will  be perceived.  Parekh puts  it  more  strongly:  ‘We can hardly be said to 
respect a person if we treat with contempt or abstract away all that gives meaning to 
his life and makes him the kind of person he is’ (Parekh, 2000, p. 240). 
This point is often expressed by the idea that in a multicultural society it is 
important that citizens respect other cultures or respect cultural difference.   Typical 
examples are ‘a commitment that people will respect the diverse views and culture of 
their neighbours’ (The UK government’s Respect Action Plan, p. 273) and ‘Photo 
activities can help children appreciate diversity, challenge stereotypes and develop 
respect for other cultures’ (Oxfam 2006: p.10). If we take such sentiments seriously in 
an educational context, we much consider that the onus to respect ‘other’ cultures falls 
not only on the majority culture (if there is such a thing) of a particular society, but on 
all members of the society whatever their culture.  This view is one that I have seen 
expressed in the words ‘cultures should respect each other’.  One might interpret this 
simply as a shorthand way of saying that people, of whatever culture, should respect 
other people, of whatever culture; in other words, what is intended might be reduced 
simply to an affirmation of the importance of respect for persons, with understanding 
of cultural difference playing no more than an instrumental role in enabling people to 
see how to express their respect.  I want to argue that the relation between respect and 
culture goes deeper than this, in two ways.
First, respect should not be understood purely as an individual phenomenon.  An 
example can be drawn from the UK government policy referred to in the previous 
paragraph.  The Respect Action Plan refers to the need to build ‘a culture of respect’ 
(pp. 2, 5, 9).  There is a valid insight here: that whether individuals treat each other 
with respect is dependent in part on the example set by others and the perceived 
expectations of others.  Respect for persons, or the lack of it, is itself in part a cultural 
phenomenon.  
It is not unusual to find that attitudes or values are attributed to a culture. To 
do this is not merely to sum up the attitudes or values of the individuals who are seen 
as belonging to that culture; it is to say something also about social practices which 
can be instantiated in political institutions, media, education systems and so on.  We 
know roughly what is meant by such claims as that one culture values cricket while 
another values baseball (and the basis for such claims is not destroyed by the fact that 
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in each cultural context there will be many individuals who are indifferent to cricket 
and baseball respectively).  Similarly we can know what is meant by claims that, for 
instance,  a  culture  respects  self-made  entrepreneurs,  or  a  culture  does  not  respect 
intellectuals, or a culture does not respect women.  
No doubt these are problematic ways of speaking, but the problem lies in the 
implication that distinct cultures, distinguished by such features, can be identified.  As 
will be argued below, the phenomena of culture are much more fluid than this.  But 
the insight that respect, for particular objects, manifested in particular ways, is a 
cultural as well as an individual phenomenon, remains valid.  This is an important 
point for education: as regards nurturing respect, the responsibilities of teachers, and 
the opportunities open to them, are not limited to seeking to induce attitudes of respect 
in individual students; teachers can and should seek to nurture a culture of respect at 
least within the classroom and school environment.
I said above that the relationship between respect and culture is more than an 
instrumental  one  (awareness  of  a  person’s  cultural  location  being  instrumental  to 
expressing respect for a person) in two ways. To explore the second way we need to 
ask  whether  persons  can  and  should  respect  cultures  over  and  above  respecting 
persons. In other words, should teachers encourage their students to respect cultures 
as such? Whether a Jewish child in the classroom does or does not treat a Muslim 
child with respect is a question that can be addressed in terms of respect for persons. 
Respect here involves awareness of an individual’s cultural context, but this is still 
respect for persons, not respect for cultures as such.  There are some who would say 
that respect, properly speaking, can only be extended to persons.  The thinking behind 
such a view may well  be Kantian:  that  it  is  only the rational  moral  capacities  of 
persons - precisely the capacities that make it possible for persons to have respect - 
that make persons fit objects of respect.  On such a view, there is something suspect 
about respect for an abstract entity such as a culture.
My argument on this point will first present a case in which we seem to need 
the idea of respect for a particular culture, and will then proceed by analysing what 
respect in such a case involves.  The world in which the idea of global citizenship 
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makes sense is a world in which there are many possibilities of relationships between 
cultures  that  are  not  direct  person-to-person relationships.  Consider  the  following 
case.
In September 2005 a Danish newspaper published cartoons that lampooned the 
prophet Muhammad, in one case depicting the prophet as a terrorist. By January 2006 
reports about these cartoons had spread widely through the Muslim world, leading to 
protests  in  several  countries.  Protests  escalated  in  February  after  several  other 
European publications reprinted the cartoons. There was widespread media coverage 
of  the  protests,  and  discussion  of  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  the  case,  continuing 
through February into March 2006.4
I  shall  assume  for  the  argument  here  that  there  were  indeed  substantial 
grounds for moral objection to the publication of the cartoons, without attempting to 
assess whether these grounds may have been outweighed by other considerations, as 
some liberal proponents of freedom of expression claim.  
What  should  we  consider  to  have  been  wrong  or  objectionable  about  the 
publication of those cartoons?  The offence caused to many Muslims is certainly one 
consideration, but the fundamental issue here is not the psychological consequence 
that feelings of hurt or offence were caused to many individuals (nor, in this case, do 
the numbers offended seem very relevant).  The more fundamental issue is the reason 
why the cartoons were (perceived as) offensive.5 We can say that the cartoons were 
disrespectful.  But  to  whom?  Given  that  there  is  no  direct  person-to-person 
relationship operating here (between, say, the cartoonist and some particular Muslims 
who might be offended) an individualist analysis along Kantian lines does not appear 
to work.  It is hardly that the many millions of Muslims in the world were being used 
purely as means towards the ends of the cartoonist or of the publishers.
One could say that the cartoons were disrespectful to the prophet Muhammad - 
as indeed they were perceived to be - but that does not yet capture the fundamental 
objection.  While disrespect to the dead - even those who died centuries ago - may 
perhaps in general be undesirable, what is important here is clearly the very special 
status of the prophet Muhammad to Muslims.  We cannot understand the objection to 
the publication of the cartoons without referring to the beliefs and values and religious 
practices  of  Muslims,  that  is,  to  (aspects  of)  Islamic  culture.  Since  these  beliefs, 
values  and  practices  are  not  susceptible  to  an  individualist  reduction,  this  is  an 
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example where it makes good sense to say that the lack of respect in question was 
lack of respect for a certain kind of culture.
If the case just considered shows that it is possible to have respect, or lack of 
respect, for a culture, this does not yet enable us to see whether any particular culture 
should be respected, or on what grounds we might say that it should be, or whether 
indeed citizenship education should encourage people to have respect for cultures - 
any cultures - as such.   These questions demand further attention to what is involved 
in respect.
Respect,  in  all  the  contexts  with  which  this  article  is  concerned,  involves 
recognising value in someone or something independently of its relationship to one’s 
own desires, preferences and goals (here the root Kantian notion of not treating the 
object purely as a means to one’s own ends, but as an end in itself, still has force, even 
if we need to extent its application beyond persons).  In a formulation used by Raz, 
respect  is  a  matter  of  ‘recognising  the  value  of  the  object  of  respect,  and  being 
disposed to react appropriately’ (Raz, 2001, 137 footnote).  This formulation is broad 
enough to encompass two importantly different ways in which respect can operate. 
Some philosophers would argue that there are two distinct kinds of respect in question 
here,  or  two  distinct  senses  of  ‘respect’.   The  exact  distinctions  made,  and  the 
terminology in which they are expressed, vary from one philosopher to another; one 
of  the  most  commonly  cited  is  a  distinction  drawn  by  Darwall  (1977)  between 
‘recognition respect’ and ‘appraisal respect’, where the former recognises the value in 
something, while the latter makes some judgement of how great the value is.  Others, 
including Raz, have questioned whether such a distinction does mark two different 
kinds of respect.  For the present purpose, it is sufficient to note that some cases of 
respect involve comparison between one object of respect and another, while other 
cases do not; I shall mark the distinction here by the terms ‘comparative respect’ and 
‘non-comparative respect’.
Sometimes we respect particular individuals for what they have achieved or 
what  they  have  contributed  to  society.  I  might  respect  someone  for  their  skill  in 
philosophy  or  for  their  work  for  charity.  Here  there  is,  at  least  implicitly,  a 
comparison made with others: not everyone is such a good philosopher or has made 
such  important  contributions,  so  not  everyone  is  deserving  of  respect  for  these  
reasons.  In contrast, respect for persons, as it is understood in the broadly Kantian 
tradition, does not rest on distinctions between one person and another.  We are to 
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have  and  show  respect  for  persons  as  such,  independently  of  our  comparative 
judgement of their qualities.  Respecting persons as such is not incompatible with our 
expressing  disagreement  with  them  or  criticising  their  personal  qualities  or  their 
beliefs, though it should make a difference to how we do that.  
If  we  can  recognise  the  distinction,  with  regard  to  persons,  between 
comparative  and  non-comparative  respect,  then  we  can  ask  whether  the  same 
distinction  can  apply  to  respect  for  cultures.  There  seems  to  be  no  conceptual 
difficulty in having respect in a comparative way for particular aspects of particular 
cultures.  We  can  admire,  say,  Islamic  art,  and  so  respect  Islamic  culture  for  its 
historical contribution to the world’s artistic traditions; similarly for its contribution to 
mathematics and to Aristotelian scholarship.  Here, since an appraisal is being made, 
there is at least an implicit comparison with what might have been the case and with 
other cultures for which the same claims cannot be made.   Respecting a culture in this 
sense  is  analogous  to  respecting  individuals  as  artists  or  as  scholars,  for  their 
particular qualities and contribution. The implicit comparison is shown in the fact that 
it would not make sense to respect everyone as an artist or everyone as a scholar; 
there are some persons, indeed many, who have made no contribution that could merit 
respect of that kind.  Similarly, there may be cultures that have not shown the qualities 
that would merit respect under these particular categories. 
Again,  we can criticise  individual persons for deficiencies in their  personal 
qualities and for moral failings.  Cultures too can be criticized; certainly nothing in 
this argument rules that out.  But in the case of persons, we can hold that criticism of 
individuals is not incompatible with respect for them as persons. The question remains 
whether we can and should respect cultures as such, in a way that is not incompatible 
with appraising and either praising or criticizing particular aspects of those cultures. 
Are there cultures as such?
We need to face a problem with the idea of respecting cultures.   Notwithstanding 
philosophical  conundrums  about  personal  identity,  for  practical  purposes  we  can 
usually identify one person as distinct from another.  Indeed, this is implicit in the 
way respect  for  persons  operates  as  a  fundamental  moral  value:  it  underpins,  for 
instance, the language of human rights as inalienable rights  of individuals.  But it is 
not at all clear that we can identify distinct cultures.  There is no disputing cultural 
differences;  indeed,  it  has  been  argued  above  that  respect  for  persons  has  to  be 
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sensitive to cultural  differences.  The question is whether the differences fall  along 
fault  lines  that  enable  us,  without  artificiality,  over-simplification  and,  indeed, 
stereotyping,  to  say  ‘this  is  Islamic  culture’,  ‘this  is  Christian  culture’,  ‘this  is 
European  culture’,  ‘this  is  Japanese  culture’,  or  whatever.   The  evident  overlaps 
between  even  these  categories  already  show  that  cultures  cannot  readily  be 
compartmentalized.  
Realistically,  we need to recognise many dimensions of cultural  difference: 
religious beliefs, values that are most salient for people, language, identification with 
a  nation,  a  sense  of  historical  connection  with  certain  others,  geographical  roots, 
typical patterns of family structure, forms of art and decoration, everyday practices in 
dress and food:  these are just some of the more evidently recognisable dimensions of 
difference.  It is inherently unlikely that all the possible differences along so many 
dimensions will align and match up into just a few of what we might call Cultures 
with an upper case C (cf. Haydon, 2006b, Ch. 2). Even if some liberal thinkers (e.g. 
Waldron, 1996) exaggerate the extent to which individuals in the modern world can 
take a ‘pick and mix’ approach to their own cultural identity, the cultural contexts that 
individuals  can  inhabit  are  indefinitely  variable.  Respect  for  persons  requires  a 
sensitivity to culture that is also a sensitivity to individual positioning (Stables, 2005).
The point is of practical educational importance. A serious risk in promoting 
within education the idea of respecting cultures as such is that by seeking to promote 
such respect we may at the same time promote a false and dangerous idea of cultures 
as distinct entities.  Faced with this risk, we may think it better to retreat from the idea 
of respect for culture and emphasise respect for persons alone. Yet this also carries a 
risk for citizenship education: that the persons who are taught to respect persons as 
such may not be sufficiently sensitive to cultural difference and thereby not in practice 
able to respect all persons equally.
Respect for culture
We need,  I  suggest,  an  idea  of  respect  for  culture  -  for  the  multifarious  cultural 
context of human life - rather than respect for  cultures as such.  We may find an 
analogy for respect for culture in the idea (also important for citizenship education, 
but  not the topic of this  article)  of respect  for the environment.   It  is  possible to 
respect the natural environment in the sense of recognising that there is value in the 
natural environment independently of the ways in which human beings can use the 
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environment for their own ends: indeed, this is a theme of much environmental ethics. 
To have respect for the environment is necessarily to recognise the reality and the 
importance of different environments. The differences are real: a polar environment is 
very different from a tropical environment, for example.  But, at the same time, it is 
not that different environments exist in distinct compartments; on the contrary, we are 
very much aware now (and it is another constant theme of environmental ethics) of 
the influence of one part of ‘the environment’ on another. We can have respect for the 
environment,  and  for  environmental  difference,  without  treating  parts  of  the 
environmental whole as being distinct entities.
Analogous to respect  for the natural  environment  would be respect  for the 
cultural context of human life.  If we ask why we should have respect for the cultural 
context  of human life,  in all  its  diversity,  then the answers we might  give do not 
entirely overlap with answers to the equivalent questions concerning respect for the 
environment.  We can make sense of the idea of natural objects - rocks, forest and so 
on - and other aspects of the natural environment having a value quite independently 
of their being the context for human life and subject to human intervention. Culture 
does not have value independently of its being the context of human life.  The point is, 
rather, that it is much more than just the context of human life. It is more like the 
ground  or  substrate  of  the  lives  of  individual  human  beings.  Crucially,  the  very 
qualities  that  on  a  Kantian  approach  are  the  grounds  for  respect  for  persons 
(rationality,  with  the  possibility  of  a  rationally-based  moral  consciousness)  are 
qualities that cannot develop, let alone flourish, outside a cultural context.   For Kant, 
respect for persons is itself grounded in respect for the rational and moral capacities 
that distinguish persons from other entities;  the present point is that the individual 
possibility of developing those capacities  is grounded in a context  that necessarily 
transcends the individual.  The cultural ground, then, can itself be seen as a fit object 
of respect.  
Educating for intercultural respect
The upshot  of  these  arguments  is  that  education  should  promote,  not  the  idea  of 
respect for each of a number of distinct cultures - since that is itself a flawed idea - but 
an attitude of respect towards human cultural contexts in all their variety. As noted 
above in reference to Raz, beliefs about other persons and their cultural context are a 
vital area for educational attention.   Students must be taught about the sheer diversity 
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of human cultural contexts –since this is something they will not necessarily learn 
from their own classroom environment – and must be helped to recognise the sheer 
importance  of  culture  as  the  necessary  grounding  for  human  life.  They  need  to 
recognise that their own cultural context is not to be taken for granted and is not to be 
assumed as  the norm.  They need, as part of a respectful attitude, to work with the 
presumption that in any cultural context there is something of value that can explain 
why human beings can find meaning and identity in that context.  
It is often said that we should celebrate diversity.  It can equally be questioned 
whether  diversity  as such is  something to  be celebrated  -  given that  the  diversity 
necessarily  includes  all  that  may  from  whatever  perspective  be  appraised  as 
undesirable in human nature and practices as well as all that may be admired.  To 
focus on respect rather than celebration may help educators and their students to take 
a  more  sober view.  Diversity in human culture is  important  because it  opens up 
possibilities for human achievement and flourishing that would otherwise never have 
developed.  At the same time, unavoidably, it opens up possibilities of disagreement 
and conflict.  We should respect the diversity of human cultural contexts, not only in 
the sense that we respect a positive achievement, but also in the sense that we can 
respect  something  of  importance  that  is  outside  our  individual  control,  not  to  be 
ignored or trifled with. 
The task for teachers in promoting cultural respect is, unavoidably, a difficult 
one.   Teachers  have  to  recognise,  and  bring  their  students  to  recognise,  cultural 
difference without stereotyping.  They have to bring their students to an attitude that 
will not refuse to make evaluative comparisons, yet will work with a presumption that 
there is something of value in any cultural context.  They have to do this, in most parts 
of the world, in schools in which a degree of cultural diversity is present within the 
classroom,  so  that  sensitivity  is  needed  to  the  culturally-grounded  perceptions  of 
individuals actually present, while at the same time they have to open their students’ 
eyes to the still greater diversity that the students will, for the time being, know only 
at second hand. 
While  each  teacher  will  see  their  primary  responsibility  as  lying  with  the 
individual students who pass through their classroom, there is also a broader task that 
educators share, and this is itself a cultural task.  It was argued above that it is not 
only individuals who can have attitudes of respect.  Respect can itself be a cultural 
phenomenon; one cultural climate may be more respectful than another of diversity or 
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non-conformity.   Educators share the task of trying to create and maintain cultural 
conditions - an appropriate ethical environment - that will be supportive of individual 
respect for cultures.6  
The educational task, then, is complex and daunting.  It will not be possible to 
lay  down a  formula  by  which  teachers  should  proceed  in  promoting  intercultural 
respect.  The need will be as great here as in any area of education for the exercise of 
practical wisdom by teachers (McLaughlin, 1999).
Acknowledgements
On the topics of this paper I have had valuable discussions with Muna Golmohamad, 
Nur  Surayyah  Madhubala  Abdullah,  and participants  at  the  2006 congress  of  the 




 Plausible examples, subject of course to historical evidence, are schools for white students in ante-bellum southern 
States of the USA and in pre-apartheid South Africa, and schools in Nazi Germany. Without full review of the evidence 
it would be too contentious to speculate on whether there are still schools in some parts of the world today in which 
negative attitudes towards certain groups are deliberately or inadvertently promoted.
2 The idea of global citizenship has been promoted to educators by The Council for Education in World Citizenship 
(www.cewc.org) and by Oxfam (www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/globalcitiz).  Academic discussions can be found in, 
e.g. Dower and Williams(2002) and Heater (2002)  
3 This is a policy, promoted under the general heading of ‘The Respect Agenda’, which arguably has as its primary 
purpose to do something about, and be seen as a government to be doing something about, anti-social behaviour in 
British society.  The Respect Action Plan can be found at www.respect.gov.uk/assets/docs/respect  _action_plan.pdf  .
4 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1699811,00.html (1 February 2006) for an early report, and 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/cartoonprotests/story/0,,1791557,00.html for a retrospective view in June 2006.
5
65 For more on respect as the value underlying offence and offensiveness as moral categories, see Haydon (2006a) and 
Barrow (2006).
6See Haydon (2004) and Haydon (2006b) for the background to the idea that values education is about creating and  
sustaining  a  desirable  ethical  environment.  For  valuable  discussions  of  the  issues  facing  teachers  in  multicultural  
environments see Stables 2005 and McLaughlin 2003.
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